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1. About the report
The Marginalized and Vulnerable Groups Study grew out of a concern that some marginalized segments
were left out of the development process in the areas where Program Nasional Pemberdayaan
Masyarakat Mandiri-Pedesaan (PNPM-Rural Rural)—a country-wide community driven development
project in Indonesia–works. Previous studies on the Kecamatan Development Project (KDP), the
predecessor of PNPM-Rural, as well as the baseline survey for PNPM-Rural indicates that decision-
making within the project favors the majority and better-off as opposed to poorer villagers and those
living in outlying areas (McLaughlin, Satu, & Hoppe, 2007).2 The poorer groups, which include female
heads-of-households and heads-of-household with no primary education, have limited participation in
the KDP/PNPM-Rural decision making process, as about 75 percent of the poor attending the meetings
were passive participants (Gibson and Woolcock, 2005; Voss, 2008). Other studies have shown that
despite the passive nature of participation, when compared to similar projects, KDP/PNPM-Rural was
better in getting the poor involved (Agung and Hull, 2002).3 This study was undertaken to better
understand the dynamics of participation, defined as “a process through which stakeholders influence
and share control over development initiatives, decisions and resources which affect them”.4
2. Objective of the study
This study attempts to answer the following questions:
 Who participates in PNPM-Rural and who does not?
 Why do these groups not participate? What are the obstacles to participation
 What can be improved in poverty programs such as PNPM-Rural or other targeted programs to
reach these groups?
The socio-economic and political reasons are examined to understand why some groups participate in
the development process and others are marginalized.
1 The World Bank provided financial support for this study.
2 McLaughlin, K., Satu, A., & Hoppe, M. (2007). Kecamatan Development Program Qualitative Impact Evaluation .
Jakarta: The World Bank
3 Gibson, C., & Woolcock, M. (2005, September). Empowerment and Local Level Conlflict Mediation in Indonesia: A
Comparative Analysis of Concepts, Measures, and Project Efficacy. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper
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23. Methodology
To answer the research questions the methodology used was qualitative. Apart from related documents
reviews, data were collected mostly through interviews with key informants and selected focus group
discussions. Cross interviews, especially (but not limited to) with informants of different positions, socio-
economic background and (presumed) interests, were used to verify answers.
Field work was done in 24 villages in 12 sub-districts (kecamatan) in six provinces (West Sumatra, West
Java, West Kalimantan, West Nusa Tenggara, South Sulawesi and Papua) from October to December
2009. Within each sub-district, research sites were selected as follows: one randomly selected village
and the village one considered poorest.
4. Main findings
4.1 On Participation and Socio-Economic Structure
Corroborating previous studies, this study finds those marginalized groups have limited participation
in the decision making process in PNPM-Rural when compared to other groups in the village.
Dissecting the socio-economic structure reveals some insight to the dynamics of participation in decision
making within PNPM-Rural.
Community groupings are not neatly confined within economic status as the term “marginalized”
implies (although marginalized people are mostly poor/very poor). They can cross or overlap economic
groups. In relation to PNPM-Rural participation (or non participation) generally there are four major
groups: the elite, the activists, the majority, and marginalized groups. The elite are the wealthy, village
government leaders, and the religious and customary leaders while the activists are villagers who posses
knowledge on government projects and use this knowledge to get involved. These activists, such as
those in farmers’ groups and PKK (government-led women’s group), have a close relationship with
government leaders. The majority of the village population are people with few assets or small income
levels, such as small landowners, ojeg drivers (motorcycle taxi drivers), small industry workers and
mobile vendors. The marginalized groups can be characterized as having no (valuable) assets, living in
outlying areas with limited basic infrastructure, having limited income with a large number of
dependents, and originating from an ethnic/religious minority.
Of the elite, the village officials have most influence over the decision making in PNPM-Rural. They
work together with the activists who participate actively in village meetings and in program
implementation. They can manipulate or intervene in PNPM-Rural processes when it suits their
interests. Contrary to common perception, the wealthy are not interested in becoming involved in
development programs unless there are specific projects that would benefit them. Customary leaders
are not that involved either, except the ninik mamak in West Sumatra and the clan leaders in Papua.
Religious leaders were not interested in being involved, except in West Java. The majority is more
informed about the Project than the marginalized group, but they are not actively involved in village
discussions, and hence have little influence on decisions, unless they have close relations with the village
leaders or customary leaders. The marginalized group is the least involved, except as construction
laborers, and has little information to start with. Their voice may be heard if they happen to have a
personal relationship with the activists and officials.
Special meetings for women to agree on “women” proposals, including savings and loans, increase
women’s participation but decisions are still limited to the elite and activists. The participants are
3usually the prospective borrowers for the savings and loans component of PNPM-Rural. These are
women who have regular income (e.g., teachers, traders) and are thought to be able to repay their
loans. Very few women from the marginalized group are invted to participate.
Despite limited participation, marginalized groups enjoy the benefits of the Project albeit not as much
as the other groups. In fact, in case of PNPM-Rural’s infrastructure, the majority of the population
benefits although the project might not be their preference. Many from the marginalized group also
work as construction laborers on these projects.
4.2 On Obstacles to Participation
Facilitation, which is expected to circumvent the elite dominance, is weak. Kecamatan Facilitators
(FKs) are loaded with administrative work and focus more on project procedures than facilitating
different groups, particularly the marginalized group, to enable them to have their voices heard. When
these facilitators are assigned to train the village facilitators (KPMDs), focus on facilitation is further
reduced. Given their workload and capacity FKs are unable to assist and supervise 10-20 KPMDs
adequately. Facilitation needs time to deepen or advance gradually over time. Most facilitators do not
have the skills for (nor the awareness of) this kind of facilitation.
The PNPM-Rural process has become routine and does not inspire participation. Facilitation for
empowerment is not a quick fix that can be done by a repeated, mechanistic process year in/year out,
eventually boring many villagers to get involved. The long process and “laddering up” discussions (from
hamlets to inter-village) lead to thinning participation. Skills of facilitators, high turnover of FKs in some
place, and elite intervention, all contribute to the decreasing levels of enthusiasm and expectation.
Design and institutions could not keep pace with Project scale-up. The Project was scaled up from
working in 26 villages in the pilot project (1997) to 61,000 villages (2010) but the design and institutions
did not adjust adequately. To keep up with the scale-up, implementation becomes more focused on
administrative procedures and the process becomes more mechanical, leaving behind the facilitation for
empowerment. The monitoring and evaluation follow suit. The Project is not able to monitor the quality
of participation, other than quantitatively, because there are too many areas to monitor, instead of
selecting some issues deemed important to the Project (i.e., participation).
Delays in disbursement are also attributable to institutional capacity. When these delays occur in a
nation-wide Project, the impact is substantial. It appears that the institutional capacity is not ready to
support this Project. Almost in every village in this study the delays in disbursement, especially the
operational funds that come from the local government, lead to “short cuts” in the process. They create
frustration among project actors and villagers. In some case, when money does not come on time (e.g.,
loans for planting), it ends up being used for other purposes than what it is intended for.
5. Recommendations
Community empowerment does not usually operate on a large scale because of the intensive facilitation
required. A large-scale project cannot afford but a specific focus and practical objectives as they tend to
be “mechanical.”5 Therefore, we opt for redesigning the large-scale PNPM-Rural to focus on a single
area to be more effective. In this case the “division” of PNPM-Rural into PNPM-Rural Inti and PNPM-
5 PNPM-Rural covers 61,000 villages in Indonesia in more than 4,000 sub-districts. More than 10,000 Kecamatan
Facilitators (FKs) had to be recruited (half of them are engineers). They train and supervise 10-20 village facilitators
in each sub-district.
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program.6 Given that marginalized groups’ poor levels of participation, the question of increasing the
number of activities moving through PNPM-Rural Inti should be carefully considered. PNPM-Rural Inti
has more effectively worked with infrastructure. Increased numbers of dedicated facilitators are needed
to more effectively facilitate marginalized groups and on savings and loans or they should be developed
gradually through pilot activities of PNPM-Rural Penguatan. The followings will discuss the proposed
solutions for PNPM-Rural in more details.
5.1 Selecting a single focus
Capitalize on PNPM-Rural’s strength by focusing only on community infrastructure, which is what
PNPM-Rural has done best. Although infrastructure does not yet proportionally benefit the
marginalized group and probably never will, the study found that PNPM-Rural has been able to provide
the needed public goods that even the marginalized group enjoy. In some villages, especially the
isolated areas, PNPM-Rural has been the only program that responded to the villagers’ requests.
Involvement (in a broader sense) of the marginalized group is also relatively higher than in the loan
activities, at least as laborers in the construction work. Quality of infrastructure has been known to be
generally good and relatively cheaper than those being built by regular contractors, as previous studies
of KDP have shown. Providing better access through infrastructure is a “trademark” of PNPM-Rural and
it is by all means not less important than providing small loans. Hence, the study recommends that the
main PNPM-Rural (or PNPM-Rural Inti) only focus on providing infrastructure. The single focus would
help ease the burden of facilitation and still bring significant benefits. Other activities should be done
selectively as PNPM-Rural Penguatan (see 4.2 and 4.3 below).
Simplify the PNPM-Rural mechanism without compromising public participation through plebiscites.
Kecamatan and desa facilitators are not well prepared for intensive and skillful facilitation that would
enable marginalized groups to participate in a more substantial manner, i.e. decision-making. In fact,
finding or producing thousands of good facilitators is an enormous challenge.7 In addition, many
villagers confess to being exhausted by the numerous meetings. Also, laddering the discussions from the
hamlets up to the sub-districts did not provide more opportunities for participation. In fact, by the time
the discussion reaches the sub-district, very often the voice of the people in the hamlets may have
evaporated. The program requires a much simpler mechanism. The study recommends that selection of
village proposals are made through a plebiscite instead of deliberations. This mechanism was tried out
in PNPM-Rural villages several years back. This experiment shows that selection of proposals is similar to
6 Literally PNPM-Rural Inti means “main” PNPM-Rural while PNPM-Rural Penguatan means “strengthening” PNPM-
Rural. PNPM-Rural Penguatan is a “refined offspring” of PNPM-Rural that has been developed to focus on a
specific group or issue that needs additional inputs, including special grant money. These PNPM-Rural Penguatan
are Green KDP (working on environmental issues), PEKKA (working with female household heads), PNPM-Rural
Generasi (working on health and education), and SADI (on agriculture). PEKKA, in particular, has shown that strong
facilitation has enabled female heads-of-households as a “marginalized group” to improve their position in the
community and, for many, improve their livelihood.
7 After the completion of fieldwork we understand that PNPM-Rural management is undertaking substantial
changes, in particular in reducing the workload of facilitators to let them have more time for facilitation.
Facilitators need only to provide reports to the Kabupaten. They do not have to train the village facilitators—
professional trainers will do the work. Village proposals that have been verified but not funded will be
automatically funded in the following year. Other changes include training methods for facilitators that allow more
reflection and groups’ discussions. Results of these changes are not yet observed. (Interview with Bapak Bito
Wikantosa of PNPM-Rural Secretariat, April 29, 2010).
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Satisfaction is also rated higher when proposals are selected through direct votes.8
To offset the bias of hamlets with large populations, proposals should be weighted. A simple scoring
system can be made, using two criteria: population size of hamlet and distance of the proposed project
site to village center. Proposals from hamlets with small population weigh more and so do project sites
that are further away from the village center.
5.2 Tending marginalized groups
Facilitate marginalized groups to organize to voice their needs. By definition the marginalized group
lack resources, access to information, and confidence—hence, they are the groups that need special
support through PNPM-Rural to ensure that their voice is properly heard and not just represented by
elites. However, unlike the other PNPM-Rural programs, we recommend that there is no special grant
awarded to these groups. These groups are not intended to be exclusive or become a “special” group
with its own funds that might alienate them from the rest of the villagers. The main objective of the
special facilitation is to strengthen the groups to enable them to participate more actively in decision
making in village activities, including PNPM-Rural and its SPP. Specifically, for “leveling the playing
field”, the facilitation should aim to develop the marginalized groups’ organizing capacity, negotiation
skills, networking, and access to information to enable them to voice their needs and demand some
response. This kind of empowerment might need two-three years to develop. Members of the groups
should be targeted to the bottom 10 percent of the village population, shielding away the better-off and
elite. For the first phase, pilot activities can be done in a few districts that have shown some indication
of organizing capacity.
5.3 Facilitating more sustainable savings and loans
Focus only where savings and loans work with specific facilitation. There is generally no lack of
demand for loans in the study sites, but only in a few cases groups are able to improve their livelihood
through the loans. Findings of the study show that in most places SPP does not work as expected.
Groups are just recently formed and specifically for the purpose of getting the PNPM-Rural loans. Many
members, particularly the poor who are included to meet PNPM-Rural requirements, do not have any
clear idea what kind of income-generating activities they would do with the loan. Their business is often
not viable. Even if they have good business, there is hardly any group activity that would strengthen the
group—as the borrower—and help it deal with problems the members face, e.g., in marketing and
getting materials in bulk for lower prices. In very few cases, when it does work, SPP helps the
marginalized group to improve their livelihood, such as the case in South Sulawesi where the group
leader is very committed in helping poor women in her hamlet. In general, however, the current model
appears to put SPP as an “appendix” to PNPM-Rural: relatively little focused support other than book
checking, and it is not sustainable as repayment is still low (see Chapter 2). Clearly small credit groups
under PNPM-Rural need specific facilitation, too, since their needs are different from the general
facilitation PNPM-Rural provides so far. Facilitation is needed to strengthen the group and examine the
problems the group faces, including in running their business(es). Treatment would be different when
groups consist of members with individual business than those with group business. Obviously, such
intensive assistance cannot be provided in a large scale. We recommend that SPP is turned into PNPM-
8 See Olken, Ben (2008). “Direct Democracy and Local Public Goods: Evidence from a Field Experiment in
Indonesia.” NBER Working Paper No. 14123.
6Rural Penguatan, too, and given only to selected areas that have proved to be working (i.e., good
repayment rate).
5.4 Institutional and technical improvements
The scaled-up PNPM-Rural now requires different handling, institutionally and technically. Below are
some recommendations to improve the operations of PNPM-Rural, bearing in mind that the technical
improvements will not significantly encourage participation of the marginalized group.
 Facilitation school for facilitators. One of the most consistent findings in the study is the lack of
awareness and low quality of facilitation skills of the FK and KPMD—the latter is more of an
output of the weak FK. The new training school that PNPM-Rural currently works with is the
right step to take to increase and improve the pool of qualified facilitators. The results are still
too early to evaluate whether the school actually increases the competency of the facilitators.
 Training, and operational costs for KPMD from UPK. If FK is qualified, including being capable
of training the KPMD, the KPMD could get a better training. The recent idea to release the FK
from training the KPMD and delegate the work to professional trainers is positive.9 However,
good training by itself is not enough. In the case of KPMD the operational costs have become a
major block to enable KPMD to go to all hamlets, especially the isolated areas that usually are
the furthest. Even if the work of the KPMD is intended to be partially volunteerism (the wages
they get are small), it is hardly viable for most KPMD to pay for the gas (and a few of them have
motorcycles) or other transportation. These operational costs can be paid by the proceeds of
the Kecamatan UPK.
 Focus on key participation issues to monitor and provide feedback. For a program as large as
PNPM-Rural it is hardly possible to monitor everything in detail. Hence, some priorities need to
be made as to which areas the Program is interested in. These priority areas need to be
reported in greater detail to have sufficient information to enable the Program to use it for
necessary alteration. In participation, for example, it is not enough to report how many people,
men and women, poor and non-poor, attend a meeting, but also who talks to influence the
decision made. FK should be responsible for ensuring the work of KPMD, including in reporting,
meets the standard. Most importantly, periodically the Kabupaten Facilitators should make
spot checks of what has been reported (e.g., the attendance list) by the Kecamatan Facilitators,
and report the results. Reports from the field need to be responded to, thus sending the
message that these reports matter.
 Use independent monitoring groups. The regular monitoring should be complemented by an
independent monitoring group, particularly to provide more qualitative review of the PNPM-
Rural process. PNPM-Rural has been using provincial non-government organizations to do this
work for quite a few years but the quality varies. PNPM-Rural should review the work and pick
one or two of the best groups to work with a few others to improve the quality of the
monitoring.
 Reduce delays in fund disbursements to the field. Delays in fund disbursements involve
institutional preparedness that goes beyond PNPM-Rural. This is also an indication that PNPM-
Rural has always been viewed as a project rather than a program; hence the institutional
support is not adjusted to be long term. As delays have affected the quality of the program
implementation significantly, serious efforts have to be made to minimize the problems.
9 Interview with Bito Wikantosa of PNPM-Rural Secretariat, April 29, 2010.
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